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In The Supreme Court of
The State of Utah
LIVINIA ALLEN, also lmown as Livinia
Smith,
ApjJellant,

vs.

Ca!e No.

EDWARD F. ALLEN AND PEGGY F.

7247

ALLEN, his wife, also known as Alfred
-Saunders Allen,

·Respondents.

t:~. :~:t~···

.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT
It is admitted--by the parties to this controversy that
on January 12, 1929 Luisa Allen -made. a Quit-Claim Deed
to the plaintiff and defendant, Edward F. Allen,_conveyri~g .t:P~ hp~eJtnd _pr~~i$eS ther~i.n. <;le~~rjbe4.: ·:T~s Peed
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reserved a life estate in the grantor. Luisa Allen is the
mother of plaintiff and defendant, and plaintiff and defendant are half brother and sister. It is. admitted that
this Deed was recorded on J a.nuary 16, 1929, in the County Recorder's Office of Salt Lake County. After the Deed
was recorded, it was returned to Luisa Allen, it remained
in her possession until May, 1947. It is also admitted that
on September 12, 1946, said _Luisa Allen made a Deed
to the defendant, Edward F. Allen and his wife, Peggy
Allen, by which she conveyed to them the same property
described in the 1929 Deed, and that said Deed was also
recorded in the Office of the County Recorder of Salt
Lake County. The circumstances surrounding the execution of the 1946 Deed is des-cribed in the testimony, Tran~
script pages ·237 to 241. This testimony discloses that
Mr. Allen and his wife, who were temporarily employed
by the Government in the Atomic Energy Plant in Tennessee, were requested by Luisa Allen to return to Salt
Lake City. In a letter to Mr. Allen she requested him to
return home so the property could be fixed the way she
'vanted it. The defendant and his wife came to Salt Lake
in S·eptember, 1946, and at that tilne the grantor asked
}.!r. Allen if he wanted the property, that she was getting
along in years and she would like to get it taken care of
before she died. She asked Mr. Allen if he would have a
deed made. At the time of this conversation, the plaintiff was in the adjoining room (T. 239). Mr. Allen called
Mrs. Smith, the plaintiff, into the room 'vith himself and
his ·mother, and asked her if she knew what they were doing, and that his mother was making out a deed to the
pr<>perty and asked if· it was agreeable with her, and she
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said it 'Yas. The deed 'vas signed at that time and
a.elmowledged by the grantor over the t.elephone (T. 241).
This same matter 'vas testified to on Cross Examination
of ~Ir ....L\.llen (T. 271-273). Nothing ·was said by the
grantor or by the plaintiff at that time about the existence of an ·earlier deed. Later at the request of the plaintiff, Mr. Allen did some repairs to the furnace and the
home (T. 275). He received a letter from the plaintiff
written to him in Tennessee in "~hich the plaintiff said
she wished Mr. Allen would return to Salt Lake because
she H.nd her husband would like to move to other quarters.,
and that if the Aliens could return, she would. like to move
out of the place. In April, 1947, the Aliens came to Salt
Lake and because of some unpleasantness arising in the
home, Mr. Allen consulted an attorney about getting possession of the property. The attorney in p~reparing to
take~ steps to evict the Smiths from the home discovered
of record the 1929 deed. At that time Mr. Allen discussed
the.·matter with his mother, and she told him it was not
a deed, that she had made a Will. (T. 277.) This "\vas
the, first time that Mr. Allen ever knew about the existence of the 1929 Deed, and no one had ever mentioned it
to-him before (T. 249) ... The grantor said at that time
that:she had had it with her papers all the time and stated
that it was a will and not a Deed (T. 250). The Court
made a Finding (T. 1~5) finding No. 4, that neither. the
plaintiff nor the defendant had any knowledge of the
execution or recording of the 1929 deed until the month
of·l\fay, 1947. The Court's Finding in this respect is sub·sta~tiated by the Cross Examina~ion· of 1\{rs. Smith (T.
18:1. to· .1.89).; We quote· .from the. Transcript, as -follows:
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''Q. You did testify-! have written it down here
-in answer to questions by Mr. Beezley that
he asked you if you understood it. That was
at the time it was signed. (Referring to the
1946 Deed.)
A.

I didn't wholly understand it.

Q. I didn't ask you whether you understood it,
but he asked you that. Do you remember your
brother asking that~
A.

He said, ''Do you understand what I am doing1"

Q.

All right. And did you answer that question T

A.

Then he didn't answer me.

Q.

Then he didn't answer you. But at that time if
you had knowledge, or ever before had had
any knowledge about that 1929 quit ·claim
deed you didn't mention a thing about it to
your brother, did you 1

A.

You would-

Q. You didn't at that time mention anything to
him about the fact your mother had ever
executed a deed before to that property'
A.

Why should I~ Isn't it between mother and
him, or wouldn't it be between mother and
me1
·

Q.

If you would answer the question. I don't
want to know why. But you didn't1

A.

No.

Q.

Did you ever at any time between the da:te
of the execution of that deed and the date of
your mother's death up to the time this letter
was written by Mr. Beezley ev.er advise him

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
or call his attention to the fact that such a
deed had ever been executed by your mother.
deed~

A.

vVhat

Q.

This 1929 deed.

A.

No, I didn't mention it to him.

Q.

And that deed, so far as you can tell us, that
1929 deed·was kept in your mother's possession from the time it was executed until it
was delivered to Mr. Allen in 1947 when he
came back to Salt Lake~

A. I don't know about that.
Q~

You don't know where it was'
A. I don't.

Q·. You know you didn't have itY

A. I know I didn't have it.
__ - . __ Q.

A.

And you don't know that anyone else had

it~

No.

And as far as you can tell us you had never
seen it before.Y
A. No. I saw.}t at the time mother had it made
out, that is all.
Q. That is the only time you ever saw itY. ·
Q.

A. Yes.
Q. Where it was after that time you

don~t

knowY

A.

No.
Q. Then you said that night after that deed, the
1946 deed, had been executed you and your
mother talked it over~
. A . Well, I· only:·asked her about the. quit claim
.deed,.·why. she· had made···another- one .. · i .. ·
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Q. And what did she tell you'
A. Just that Ed wanted the property.
Q.

That is all she said as far as you

A.

Yes, that is all.
Mr. Hougaard: That is all.''

recall~

PLEADINGS
The Complaint, T. pages 1 to 4, alleges in paragraphs
1, 2 and 3, the execution of the two deeds in question,
which allegations are admitted by the Answer. It is also
admitted in the Answer that th~ grantor died on July
2, 1947. The balance of the Complaint merely sHeks to
quiet title to the property under the 1929 Deed, and alleges that the property is not susceptible to partition,
which latter fact is also admitted by the Answer. The
defendants first filed an Answer and Equitable CounterClaim ( T. 7-15) to which certain motions to strike were
interposed, some portions of which were granted, and
subsequently an Amended Answer and Equitable Counter~Claim was filed (T. 44-51). Certain allegations .were
made in each Answer concerning, the payment of a mortgage on th_e premises, interest thereon, taxes, insurance
and substantial repairs and ·improvements. A Bill of
Particulars was demanded in respect to these items, and
this Bill of Particulars was filed and appears at T. page~
22 to 23.
It will appear from the Counter-Claim and the Bill
of Particulars that in 1929 the home. and premises in
question were mortgaged to the Deseret Building Society by the grantor ~n the amo~nt of $~,000.00; th~t· Ed-
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F. Allen paid this mortgage and the interest thereon, amounting to the total sum of $4,740.05, and paid
taxes between 1929 and 1946 in the amount of $1800.90,
fire insurance in the amount of $132.24; that he made
substantial improvements and repairs to· the hom~ and
premises amounting to $1255.50; that he paid funeral and
burial expenses amounting to $460.00, and paid to his
mother for her support while he was in Tennessee, $20.00
~per month amounting to $602.00. These allegations of
the C{)unter-Claim were made a part thereof for the purp-ose- of invoking the equitable doctrine of contribution,
-s-ribrogati{)n and equitable assignment and as showing
··consideration for the- Deed of his mother given him -in
1946-,- and to explain the intent of the grantor in conveying the property to Mr. Allen. The only Finding made in
t-his matter is Finding Numbers 5 and 6 (T. 105-106),
where- it is found that the 1946 Deed was made in con.:sideration- of financial· assistance by the defendant to
hj_% mother, and that in view of the· Court's. other FiP.dings. it was not necessary to find upon the other:·issu·e·s
of the Counter-Claim.
·~.·--~--In: the C_onclusions of the Court (T. t06) ··and. th_e

_Jjidgffient ( T. 108~110) ·the· Court determines, as· a mutter

.9!_la:W,

that_ the Deed of January 12, 19~.9, is nu~l and
"jroid; that the Deed of Septem_her.12, 1946, _i~ good and
and quiets the title of the_ defendants i~ and tp, the
property in question.

.' ;.-

valid

.

.

...

E'XHIBITS
Th·e Exhibits introduced 'in this case are as fol'lows·:
_.:_:-~:~ ·Exhibit No~ l,t.he·Deed- bf January·12, 192'9:; Exhibit
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No. 2, the Deed of September 12, 1946; Exhibit No. 3, the
paid checks given by the defendant, Edward F. Allen, for
the support of his mother while he was away in T-ennessee, and one check to James ~. ·smith, the husband of
the plaintiff; Exhibit No. 4, the Note paid by Mr. All~n to
the Deseret Building Society; Exhibit No. 5, the Mortgage securing the above Note paid by Mr. Allen; Exhibit
No. 6, the Release of the aforesaid Mortgage; Exhibit
No.7, a receipt for repairing plumbing in the home done
at the request of the plaintiff and paid by Mr. Allen;
Exhibit A, Photostatic copy of the January 12, 1929
Deed; Exhibit B, photostatic copy of the September 12,
1946, Deed, and, Exhibit C, a letter written by Mr.
Beezley to the Aliens.
FURTHER EVIDENTIARY MATTERS
We do not believe the intent of the grantor under-the
circumstances in this cas·e, and in view of the decisions
of this court, is important, yet, we think it helpful and
, perhaps. material that some of the evidence be called._ to
the Court's attention as going p~imarily to the intent of
the grantor in the execution of the deeds in question.
There were two witness-es, old friends and acquaintances of the grantor,· who testified in this cause,. Mrs.
Catherine Pfister and ~1:rs. C. M. Hirsch.
Mrs. Catherine Pfister testified ( T. 304-321) as· follows: She had been acquainted with the grantor for -18
years (T. 304), and had known plaintiff .ahd- defendants
~ lo~g time ( T. 305). She testified th_at Mrs. Allen never
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talked about a deed, but talked about a. will, and said,
'~I made my Will,'' and off and on she said that she
\Vould like to have her son have the place because he was
very nice to her and he paid everything (T. 310) .. TheE?e
.cor~versations \Yere had in the Allen home; that the p~lain
ti:ff may or may not have be·en there. That in 1947, the
plaintiff told the 'vitness that she wanted to move; that
she \vas looking for ~house, and the witness told ]>laintiff
1f._she found out abollt one she would let her know (T.
311),. That the plaintiff told her she wanted to buy a small
place where she would not have so much hard work to do .
.This \vas before the Aliens return·ed from Tennessee.
That during the. entire twenty years that the. witness
knew the grantor, Mrs. Allen had never mentioned: any- ·
thing abou.t a dee<;! (T. 312). That s~e never talked mu~h
with Lavinia (the pla~ntiff) but that the grantor sometimes said she would like to fix it so the son could have
i~-o~ ~ccount he took care of her all these years, paid the
~-~rtgage, put the roof on and built. a- garage· (T. ~14).
Mrs. C. 1r1. Hirsch, testified concerning similar mat:lers ( T-. pages 322 to 337, as follows :
... - That s·he ·and Mrs. ·Alleri had been rather close and
friendly for about 28 years or· thirty years· (T. 822). That
-abolit three· weeks before· the death of the grantor she
:came .to her home and started to cry and said that she
had hurt her_ boy..She told m~ that she had made a will
a;nq gave me to understand that the home was· to be her
~boy_'s

as he had supported her for many years. I tried to

: stop her·. cryin.g. -She, was talking about a ~ill and the
: \Vitness-told.
her
that
she was. still alive. and that
she could
..
. .
.
.
. ..
..

..
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make it over again; that she was quite disturbed and said
that she wanted her boy to have her home; that was the
way she wanted it (T. 325). She didn't explain to me how
she had hurt her boy, but she thought he might not get
the home and that hurt her (T. 326). That you could
never talk to her, but what she would bring in her son,
and her appreciation and love for him. She was worried
the last p~art of her life because she thought something
had come up that was not right, and she didn't intend to
have it, but she referred to her will (T. 326 to 327). She
gave me to understand that she wouldn't have had a roof
over her head if he (her son) hadn't kept it there. Mrs·.
Smith, shortly before the Aliens returned from Tennessee, wanted to rent an apartment from me; that Ed was
coming home and she would have to find another place.
I told her about the neighbor across the street. She was
looking for a house ( T. 328).
Similar testimony appears in the Cross Examination
of 1\Irs. Hirsch.
The following testimony by the witness, Edward F.
Allen, is also pertinent to the question of the intention of
the parties and what they themselves had determined
should be done with the property upon the death of the
grantor.
Mr. Allen testified that on one occasion in 1940 he
and his half-sister, Mrs. Smith were discussing certain
painting which Mr. Allen intended to' do on the interior
of the home, and his sister said at that time that it did
not concern her, she wasn't interested whatever bec.ause
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.she 'vanted Mr. Allen to have the property; that it was
his hon1e; that he had spent money and time in the upkeep, ete., and she did not want any part of it. (T. 23123.2.) ''rhen ~fr. Allen was requested by the Gov·ernment
to go to Tennessee, he was endeavoring to make arrangements for the care of the home and his mother. The doctor· did not advise that the grantor go with Mr. Allen to
Tennessee because of her age and change in climate (T.
·233). He discussed th·e matter with Mrs. Smith relative to
his going, and it was agreed that the Smiths would take
nve-r .the house and take care of it to the best of their
ability, and upon their return from Tennessee, they would
-turn it-back to Mr. Allen. He agreed at that time to pay
all-necessary expenses in the upkeep of the hom·e (T.
235), and the Smiths were to live in the home without the
payment of rent. The Smiths thought it would be an
opportunity, and th·ey were glad to do it (T. 236) .
.~ ::--Mrs. Peggy Allen testified concerning a ·conversation
with ~{r. and Mrs. Smith, and the grantor in 1937 O.r 1938.
4:t that time Mrs. Smith said that they wanted to see that
the~property was fixed arid made.out to ~1:r. Allen~· Mrs.
Smith· told her mother at that time that Mr. All·en had
paid everything and she wanted him to have the p·rop~erty.
~fr. Smith said that he did not want the Aliens· to feel
that. they were vultures waiting to come in and· grab
~omething that they had not paid a cent on or done any~hing about. (T. 342.) She'"·testified that Mr. Allen came
t~ .~alt Lake from O;akridge, Tennessee about August 11,
L944, and was home about .a month waiting for a van to
come.- and. -pick·, up the ·.Allen Fur-niture. (T. 346.) . The
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Aliens were trying to make· some arrangement to rent
the home while they were away. Mrs. Allen talked to Mrs.
Smith about the home at that time and- about the Smiths
living in the home while the Aliens were away. She.
asked the Smiths how they would like to move up into
their place and take care of it while they were away.
That Mr. Allen had several things there that needed
~omeone. That they could rent it to strangers, but no
one would take care of it like one of their own family,
and they, the Aliens, would appreciate it if they would
-take care of it and that they could live there without
the payment of rent.
As the result of this understanding the Smiths
moved into the home and have remained there ever since.
(T. 348). Mrs. Smith at no time made any mention to
Mrs. Allen about the existence of the deed made in 1929.
(T. 352.) In January, 1947, Mrs. Allen wrote Mrs.
Smith that they were returning to Salt Lake. 1\Irs. Smith
answered that they had not been able to find a house
as yet, but they were looking and hoped to have a place
soon. When the Aliens arrived in Salt Lake they advised the Smiths that they would like to hav·e · their
home because they wanted to remodel it. (T. 354.) The
Smiths were then looking for a home. and the Aliens
were waiting for them to move. At that time an unpleasant incident came up between Mr. Allen and the
Smiths whicn gave rise to Mr. Allen consulting an attorney. (T. 355.) As. a result of such incident the existence of the 1929 deed became known for the first time
(T. 356) .. The m~tter of the 1929 Deed was discu·ssed
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\Yith the grantor, and she told 1frs. Allen
this was not
.
.
a deed but a \Yill (T. 357). After the death of the grantor
the Aliens moved a\Yav from the home because of un·pleasantness 'vith the Smiths, and until this case which
had been conm1enced by the Smiths could· be determined
( T. 358).
The appellant argues only Assignments 3 and 4.
These assignments 'vere based upon the claim. that the ·
eourt erred in denying validity to the 1929 Deed and
sust9.ining the validity of the 1946 Deed, and that the
Court erred in admitting in evidence conversations bet\veen the deceased and respondents.
AR.GU~fENT

Appellant at page 6 of her Brief, referring to the
J anuar~. . 12, 1929 Deed, uses this language :
''After the execution by Luisa Allen of said
Deed, she had same recorded with the County
Recorder of Salt Lake County, ·state ·Of Utah, ·and
appellant contends by virtue of this fact that .such
Deed was duly delivered.''
The_ cases cited by appellant supporting the rule
that the recording of a deed by the grantor constitutes
- ~,- sufficient delivery are cases arising in the State .of
.- ';Kansas, with the exception of two cases cited from Illi~ nois. The cases cited froii1 Arkansas, as we understand
them, do not go to the question of delivery being sufficient1y shown by mere recording o~ the deed. The .cases
:at page
9 from Arkansas and Iowa do not appear t.Q be
'
. .in.poi:o.t.
·.,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
We submit that in the great majority of jurisdictions, the-mere r·ecording of a deed by the·grantor where
the deed is returned to the grantor by the Recording
Officer, and is thereafter held in the grantor's possession
to the exclusion of the grantee or grantees, does not
constitute a sufficient delivery of the deed, and the
deed, because of want of delivery, is void.
The law relating to necessity of delivery of a deed
and what constitutes delivery will he found stated in
16 Am . Jur. Title Deeds, Sections 110-136. In ·s.ection
.111, it is said:
'.'An undelivered deed does not divest the
grantor of, or invest the grantee with, title, even
· though the intent to deliver is clear and the failure
to deliver due to accident.
·In Section 122, it is said :
''That there is no delivery of a deed sufficient
to pass title where the deed is given to the gran.tee
with the intention that it shall become OJ)erativ~
only on the death or survival of the grantor-or the
grantee.
In Section 112, it is said :

.

~

.

-••··:·..J <:.........•' ...-.;:.
.

"That the recording of a deed does no-t -pass
the title, but it only secures the title from be~-ng
defeated by subsequent sale of the land to ·ari in:
nocent purchaser, and, as hereafter mentioned,
recording a deed does not, of_ itself, op:erate as
delivery of it.''
In Section 128, it is said :
That while· delivery may be by words ;or acts
or by both combined, and manual transmission of.
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the deed from the grantor to the grantee is riot
required, it is an indispensable feature of every
delivery of a deed, whether absolute or conditional, that there be a parting with the possession
of it and with all power of dominion and control
over it, by the grantor, for the benefit of the
grantee at the time of the delivery. There is no
delivery in law where the grantor keeps the deed
in his own possession with the intention of retaining it, particularly if he keeps possession of
the property as well ; dominion over the instrument must pass from the grantor with the intent that it shall pass to the grantee, if the latter
will accept it. Where the proof fails to show that
the grantor did any act by which he parted with
the possession of the deed for the benefit of the
grantee, the question of intent ·becomes immaterial.' '
The foregoing is the rule announced by our Sup·reme
Court in this jurisdiction in the case of Singleton vs.
Kelly, 61 Ut 277, 212 Pac. 63. We shall not_ attempt to
r~cite all of the detailed facts in the Singleton case
~eca-q.se they will be_ more accurately available to the_
court by reading the decision. However, a deed had
been given by William E. Kelly, dece-ased, to hi~ _prather,
Thomas S. Kelly in 1914. After the deed w-as executed,
~fr. Henroid, who prepared it; handed the deed to the
decedent and in his presence the deceased then _handed
the deed to the grantee. Henroid was not a notary and
he informed the parties that the deed must. be acknowledged and recorded. A f.ew: _days later, May 19', 1914,
the grantor and grantee in the deed went to _.a notary
to have it acknowledged .. The deed .was _acknowledged
.Q.y the .notary and the notary then .asked the deceaseq
1
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whether he was·· turning the deed over to the ·Grantee,
Thomas S. Kelly, then or whether he expected him to
hav.e it after his death. The deceased replied, ''I mean
to kPep control of it while I live ..'' Thereupon the notary
prepared a letter of instruction addressed to himself
and signed by the deceasHd as to the delivery of the
deed upon the grantor's death. The question before the
court was whether or not the facts ·showed a sufficient
.delivery of the deed to give it validity. This question
became a matter of judicial interpretation because at a
subsequent time. the deceased concluded that he wanted
to deed part of the prop:erty to a Mrs. Tom Redman
and Mrs. Tom Redman and certain deeds were made
and executed in blank in the manner indicated in the
decision. The important aspect in .the case in so far
as it affects the case at bar is the rules of law adopted
by our court in deciding the question of delivery. The
lower court held tha:t there was no sufficient delivery
of the deed. On appeal the appellant contended that it
is a cardinal rule that the courts will carry out t4e
grantor's intention whenever that is possible, _and 'that
t~e fa~ts in that case showed an intention on the part
of· the grantor in the execution and delivery of the
earlier.
deed to make a delivery. In answering' this con.
. tention the. Supreme Court says on page _66 of the deci.sion, as follows :
4'

'

•

a

''Counsel for appellant say that it is· cardinal rule that Courts will carry out the grantor's
intention wherever this· is possible. That is true,
but without any evidence of delivery it can· be·of
no importance \Vhatever what tl1e intention of the
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grantor in this case were. One may have an intention to convey his property to another, but unless the deed is delivered to the grantee or someone for him title cannot pass, and the undelivered
deed is a nullity.''
Following the rule announced in the Singleton eas·e,
we submit that it would make no difference what the
intention of the grantor may have been at the time the
1929 deed was ,executed or what her intention may have
been at the time of recording the same. The fact 'remains
_and it is undisputed in this case that the 1929 Deed was
never delivered to ·either of the grantees, and as found
:b_y the Court neither grantee had any knowledge whatsoever of the ·existence of the Deed.
Under our Statute, Section 78-3-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, the on'ly effect and the only purpose in re-cording a deed is to import notice to ·all persons of the
contents thereof so that all subsequent purchasers, mort_gagees, or lien holders will have notice as to how the
·property is vested and what liens and incumbrances
:exist. ~gainst the same.· There is no testimony in this
. record whatever to show that by the mere recording of
:the deed the grantor intended thereby to make delivery,
and those cases which hold, as apparently do the eases
from the State of Kansas, that the recording of th·e deed
con3titutes · a delivery thereof, are limited· to very few
jurisdictions.
It will be noted by reference to the latest Kansas
~as·~s cited in App-ellant's Brief, Fooshee vs. Kasenberg,
and Carver vs. Maine, 69 Pac. 2nd,
io2 Pac. 2nd, 995,
- .
..
'

.

'

·'
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681, .that there appear no citations from any jurisdiction,
'other than the Kansas Court, and it does seem to be
well settled in that jurisdiction that recording of the
deed constitutes a sufficient delivery thereof.
In support of the above doctrine, one case. referred
to by Appellant, Miller vs. Miller at "131 Pac. L_.R.A.
1915-·A, ·671 Ann. Cas. 1917-A, 918", (the page in the
Pacific is omitted. It is reported at page 953), is· also
a Kansas cas·e.
If a deed is duly executed, and recorded, the question
would always remain until established, ·whether by the
act of recording, the Grantor intended to deliver the
deed. Under the Singleton case, Supra, there must be
an actual delivery before title can pass.
, In Section 135, 16 Am. Jur., Title Deeds, the following is said as to the effect of recording:
.I

''That while· the fact that-a deed is on record
is prima facie evidence of delivery, the . deposit
for recording of a deed by the grantor or his ag.el).t
and the actual recording thereof do not constitute
_deliyery as' a matter of la,v, for the question remains whether, by so doing, the grantor intended
to deliver the deed. It is the in tent in depositing
the deed for record, not the .fact. that it was re-:corded, that has to be considered in determining
from all the evidence whether the deposit was an
effectual delivery. N.o such in!t'ent ap.p·e;ars where
the neoord.er was exp.ressly instruc·ted 'tha.t the
deed was to be redelivered to the grantor, whcr.e
the recording was merely to facilitate the opera-:tion of an escrow, or wher,e the reco.rda.tion ·of the
deed w~as withoult the knowledge o·r assent ·of the
grarntee."
·
. . .. . .
·
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Also see 129 A.L.R Page 11, where there appears
an annotation on the question of delivery of a deed with~
out n1anual transfer or recording, and 52 A.L.R,. page
1222 on the question of delivery of a deed to a third
person to be delivered to grantee after Grantor's death.
While the latter annotation would not seem to be in
point, it is cited because of the conclusions reached by
a number of the Courts on the necessity of delivery and
placing a deed beyond the control of the grantor. It is
said on page 1227, section ' 'B '' :
''If, when the deed is handed to the depositary, there is no intention on the part of the
grantor of presently transferring title, but on the
.contrary, the grantor intends to reserve the right
of dominion over the deed and the power to r:evoke or recall it, there is no effective delivery of
the deed as a transfer of title.''
.While under some of the authorities, the recording
of the 1929 deed would be prima facie ·evidence of delivery, such we believe is not the law in this state. In
view of all of the evidence.. upon the question of the
grantor's intent, w·e submit that it is reasonably clear
that there was no intention by the mere act of recording
the deed to make delivery thereof, and that the evidence
negatives quite conclusively any intention on the. part
of' the grantor t_o make delivery of the deed. The evidence shows quite conclusively ·that neither of the
grantees knew of the existence or recording of the deed,
and the court specifically found that neither of t4e
grantees lmew of the existence or recording of the deed.
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session of the grantor from the day of its execution in
January 19·29 until the month of May, 1947. In the ordinary affairs of 'life it would seem clear that if the grantor
had any intention to make delivery of the deed that
sometim·e between January 1929 and May 1947, she
would have said something to one of the grantees ·con~
cerning the fact that she had made a deed, and certainly
if the. plaintiff had knowledge of the execution and re_cording of th:e deed at the time the second,. or 1946,· deed
was executed, she would have called the matter to the
attention of her half-brother, Edward F. Allen, and· to
the attention o-f· her mother. Instead, she was called
in at the tim·e this deed .was executed, made no ohje~
tion to the sa~e and said nothing whatever concerning
the existence of another deed. The intention of -th·e
grantor that Edward F. Allen should have the home_''w~s
made clear by the grantor during her lifetime as showil
~y the- testimony hereinbefore set forth~ She recognized
~);iat -he had more than paid. the value of the honie h¥
.the .dischar,ge of th.e mortgage, interest, taxes ·arid -,.insurance, and by snpporting his mother all during:·· t~e
yea~s from 1929 until the time of her death, as wei~ -~s
supporting t~e plaintiff up to the time of her ma!riage
in 1936.. It is likewise .clear from the testimony of Mrs.
Pfister and 1frs. Hirsch, that .sh~. wanted her son, ~d
"~.ard F. Allen, to have the home ; that she did not regard
the 1929 De-e.9. as anything· but a :wilL These_ elderly
ladies, friends of the grantor, comforted the grantor
vvhen. she. was disturbe.d about the fact that she may
have made a d-ee.d,. by saying that she could chl:lnge this
instrument. because. it was a vvill ...
.

'

..

...

~

•

•

•

•

••

'
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\"\"'" e believe it 'vould be difficult to analyze the testimony in this record without reaching the conclusion that
it was the intention of the grantor to convey the home
and premises in question to her son, Edward F. Allen,
and that she al,vays regarded the 1929 deed as a will
which she could keep within her possession and. change
.or modify the same as she saw fit. This evidence, we
believe, clearly negatives, at all events, any claim that
there was ever any thought on the part of the grantor
of making a delivery of the 1929 deed so as to give th:e
same legal eff-ect.
Appellant has cited the case of Payne vs. Henderson, 172 N.E. 173, in support of the sufficiency of delivery of the deed in question. An examination of. this
case discloses that the facts are materially different
from the case at bar. In that case the wife of the grantor
died in 1917; the grantor died in 1925. After the death
_of the grantor's wife, he arranged with his granddaughter t9 live with him and ke·ep, house for him. He was
then 75 years of age. He told his banker that he exp·ected
:to take care of his gr-and-daughter and asked his advice
about fixing his property. He was referred by the banker
'to his attorney. He went to his attorney's office and told
the attorney that he wanted to fix a deed to his granddaughter, that his grand.:.daughter was coming to_ his
· home and making a home for him. The deed ·was drawn
in ~fay, 1919 to the grand-daughter, covering the real
estate in question. After doing so, he remarked on_ sev~ ~ral

. oecasions that he _had_ provided for Nettie (the
grand-daughter).
In th·e deed he reserved a life estate .
..
.
•.

.

•.

..

~

.

.
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At a later time when his attorn·ey was preparing his will,
he said to him that there was no use of including. the
home place in the will as he had already deeded it to
·Nettie.
The t~stimony in the cas-e showed without contradiction that on several occasions the grantor spoke to
<]ifferent pe-rsons about having made the deed for the
p-a,ere tract of ground to his grand-daughter and expre~sed ;hiE? intention that she should have it. At his
death the deed to the grand-daughter was found ,witl,t
other papers in the safety deposit box of the granto~.
It was in an envelope, upo-n which was written ~n ~~h,e
grantor's. handwriting, "To Nettie Larrance." The dee<;!
was 'delivered by th·e. president of the bank to th~ granq~
daughter.apd later recorded by her.
· tn the opinion upholding th~ suffici~ncy of delivery,
the cou.rt said in. effect that the main controversy in the
_case is whether or not there was a legal delivery. of the
.deed executed on May 22, 1919. The law on this subject
ha~- been discussed at length in ·many cases presented
t9 . this Court. The adjudicated cases have ·establi~hed
the ~-·ule that delivery is necessary to make a deed vali~;
·that d~livery is· not accomplished by any particular
method or eereniony. The test in each case is the inten. tfon ·w~·th which . the act or acts reli~d o_n as the eq~i:va~~.~~
q~ _sub-stitute f.or a formal or actual delivery were done .
..$tressis laid upon the grantor's intention to vesof- title
in the grant~e. Such a deed may be effective to vest title
in the grantee although retained· by. the grantor in his
posse-Ssion until his death, .if Qther circumsta.nces do not
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show a contrary intention. Where the grant.or retains
a life estate, it raises the presumption that the deed
is to operate immediately as conveyance of the ~ee. We
are convinced from all of the evidence p·resented that
the grantor intended to have his deed of May 22, 1919,
to his grand-daug·hter become effective at that time.
The principle of law announced in the foregoing
case that a formal or actual delivery of a deed is not
ul\vays necessary to give the deed validity so long as
it is made to appear that it was the intention of the
grantor to make delivery is contrary to the holding of
this ·court in the Singleton Case, supra, and contrary
to the direct h·olding of the court in that case that one
may have an intention to convey his property to another
but unless the deed is delivered to the. grantee or someone for him, title cannot pass and the undelivered deed
is a nullity. Even if the rule in the Payne Case were to
prevail, still it is abundantly. clear from the testimony
th~t there was never any intention on the part of the
grantor to pass title by the undelivered 1929 deed.
We have found no authority which makes any distinction between the necessity for delivery of a deed
with a reservation of a life estate, and a deed without
such reservation. In principle it would. s·eem that no
such distinction could be made.

In the Payne case, supra, it is merely held th.at
wh_ere the grantor retains a life estate, it raises a pre~umption that the deed is to op~erate immediately.· This
i~ .nQ d~f:ferent t:nan saying that the recording ·of R· deed
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is prima facie evidence of delivery which many of the
·authorities hold. Th~se conclusions are not in harmony
with the decisions in the cas-e of Singleton vs. Kelly,
supra, but even if the rule were as indicated in the
Payne case, the pr~sumption or rule of prima facie ev~
dence is dissip·ated by th·e c1ear imp,ort of the testimony
showing the purpose and intention of the grantor in the
the case at bar.·
_,
This Co~rt has had occasion to consider the legal
sufficiency of a delivery of a -deed in the following
cases:
Mower vs. M-qwer, 64 U. 2·60, 228 Pacific 911;
Stanley vs. Stanley, 97 U. 520, 94 Pac. 2nd,· 41i5;
Gappm~yer vs. Wilki~sqn,_p3 U~ 236) ~7!, Pac. 763;
Chamberlain vs. Larsen, 83 U. 320, 129 Pac. 2nd,
355.
In the . M-eyer case, it was held that. there was
no
. -.
sufficient evidence of_ delivery ~n~ _that a deed found
in the grantor's possession at the time of his death is
presumed not to have been delivered ..
.

.

-

- .

In the Stanley case, it was also held that the _evi. dence failed to sufficiently show delivery of the. deed,
and this, -despite the fact that the widow of the-deceased
grantor had testified that it was delivered to her, the
Court ·stating that the acts and conduct of the plaintiff
in that case, following he'r alleged' knowledge
the
.deed, were such -as to show quite conclu~ively that ·the
··.~antor .had· no intention of deliveri~g the -deed.-. . ....

of
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The Gappmayer case Sup~ra, involved written in . .
structions for the delivery of the deed upon the death
of the grantor.
In the Chamberlain case, the Court held the delivery
of the deed to have been sufficiently sho,vn.
The appellant has cited and has quoted at length
on page 11 of his brief from the case of Sheppick vs.
Sheppic.k. This case was decided by Utah Court on January 31, 1914. It has nothing whatever to do with the
sufficiency of delivery of a deed. It is probably cited
because of its possible application t:o other phases of
the defendant's Answer and Counter C'laim.
EDWARD F. ALLEN AND PEGG·Y ALLEN WERE
NOT INCOMPETENT WITNESSES
At page 13 of appellant brief, it is claimed that the
Court improperly permitted Edward F. Allen to testify
to certain conversation had with the deceased grantor
and have cited the case of Mawson vs. Gray, 78 U. 542,
6 Pac. (2nd) 57.
Edward F. Allen and Peggy Allen defended this
action as grantees under the 1946 deed and not as heirs
of the deceased. Under such circumstances, as we understand the law, they were not inc.omp·etent witnesses.
It seems to us that this ~atter was determined by the
decision of this Court in the cas·e of Grieve vs. Howard,
54 U. 225, 180 Pac. 423, where it is said that in an actioJ1.
by an administrator to set aside a deed of his intestate,
the defendant, defe:n_ding as grante·e and not as heir
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could not object to plaintiff's testimony on the ground;
that "it was prohibit·ed by the provisions of our statuteas being testimony equally within the knowl·edge of the
witness and the deceased, such statute being inapplicable in view of the relation of the parties. There is no
int~rest in either the plaintiff or the defendant which is
adverse to the interest of the deceased person or her
estate.
J n the Stanley case, supra, it was held:
·''That declarations of the gr~ntor before, a~d
after the date of a deed; at least where it app;ears
that the declarations were made fairly and in·· th~
ordinary course of life, can be con-sidered in de-"
-termining whether a deed was delivered within~
tent to presently pass
title.''
.
'
It 'vas said by this court.in the· case of 1\Iaxfield vs~_S'an,sbury,_ .110 U:tah: 280, 172 Pac. 2nd, 122, that:. ~;-_;;~--~,;
· - ~- -- · : - .:, ·The statutes' sole purpose is to prevent the
ptooving by false-testimony of claims against the_
-, _ e_state. of a d~G~ased· person. That the testill).ony
must pertain to the transaction with the dece~sed
invo1ved in a law suit or -to a statement made -hy
. dee:eased ~ith reference to- that- transaction, and:
·be equally within the kno\vledge of both, and. that
the disqualification of a witness extends only to
thos'e suing or opposing the· executor or admini~
strator and to 'vitnesses whose interests are in
the claim urged against the estate ..

· .: --Most -of the conversations testified-. to were conversa....
..tions. had with .the deceased in the .P.~esence of. the p·laintiff.. ~.... · .... Assuming that ·one ~or mo.re· conversations· with the
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deceased 'vould have rendered either of the defendants
incompetent to testify because of the prohibition of the
stat,Jte, yet there ,.vere other conversations between the
deceased and other persons which clearly show the intent
of the grantor and ""hose testimony admittedly does not
come within the prohibition of the statute.
Furthermore, we think there was no sufficient o~
j·ection to the testimony of ·either of the defendants.
The objections made, as will appear from the reeord,
were either to the comp:etency or the materiality of th·e
testimony and not the competency of the witness, or a
general objection that the testimony was not competent
under the Dead ~Ian's Statute, T. 225, 228, 239, and in
some instances no objection was made at all, and later
objections to the testimony were waived because the
plaintiff herself testified in regard to these· conversations.
A party desiring the protection of the statute must ·
mak~ a proper and seasonable objection to the comp,e·tency of the witness because it is the witn·ess and not
the preferred testimony which is incompetent; therefore, the obj-ection must be sp·ecifically directed to the
incompetency of the witness and not to the proff'ered
testimony. Obradovich vs. Walker Brothers Bankers, 80
Utah 587, 16 Pac. 2nd, 212.
We respectfully submit that the judgm-ent of the.
lower Court should be affirm.ed.
Respectfully submitted,

A. H. HO·UGAARD,
A. W .. HOUG·AARD,
.Attorneys for Respondents
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